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Access to Literacy Under the United States
Constitution
CHRISTINE M. NAASSANA†
INTRODUCTION
In Detroit, Michigan, a fourth-grade student can
maintain a perfect attendance record, complete her
homework every day, consistently raise her hand in class,
seek out extra credit opportunities, and serve as a role model
to fellow classmates, yet still read significantly below her
grade level. This student has done everything expected of
her, and more. But at the end of the day, she is not
guaranteed the right to the education or literacy capabilities
she so eagerly seeks. In Detroit, only five percent of the city’s
fourth-graders and seven percent of the city’s eighth-graders
can read at or above a proficient level.1 This is their reality
† J.D., 2020, University at Buffalo School of Law; Executive Publications
Editor, Buffalo Law Review. I would like to thank the members of the Buffalo
Law Review for their hard work editing this Comment. Additionally, I am forever
grateful for the unconditional support of my parents, sisters, friends, and former
teaching colleagues.
1. Lori Higgins, Detroit’s Schools Score Worst in the Nation Again, But Vitti
Vows That Will Change, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Apr. 10, 2018, 12:01 AM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/education/2018/04/10/detroit-schools-againworst-nation-rigorous-national-exam-while-michigan-overall-sees-no-significant
/493893002; We Are Ten Steps Behind: Detroit Students Seek Fair Access to
Literacy,
CBS
NEWS
(Sept.
18,
2018,
8:21
AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/school-matters-detroit-students-lawsuit-claimsschools-denied-them-access-to-literacy/.

1215

1216

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

because the United States of America, a global twenty-first
century leader, recognizes no federal right to an education.2
In fact, there is no federal right for any American citizen
to receive even a minimally adequate education or sufficient
literacy instruction, as the Constitution fails to mention the
words “education” or “literacy.”3 The nation also continues to
face an ever-widening educational opportunity gap, which
some refer to as the “civil rights issue of our time.”4 At least
ten million students in low-income neighborhoods and
millions of minority students face suboptimal educational
opportunities.5 Unsurprisingly, then, the United States is
facing a literacy crisis.6 According to the U.S. Department of

2. Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate
Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 93 (2013).
3. See id. at 111.
4. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 959, 963 (2015); John B. King Jr., Education Remains the Civil Rights
Issue of Our Time, THE EDUCATION TRUST (May 17, 2017), https://edtrust.org/theequity-line/education-remains-civil-rights-issue-time/. There is a recent, growing
effort amongst education experts and organizations to stop using the phrase
“achievement gap” when referring to the disparity in academic outcomes between
lower-income students and their affluent peers. “Opportunity gap” refers to the
fact that certain arbitrary circumstances in which people are born, such as their
race, ethnicity, ZIP code, and socioeconomic status, determine their opportunities
in life, rather than differences in capability or character. “Achievement gap” is a
misnomer that inherently speaks of academic outcomes, instead of the conditions
that led to those outcomes. The phrase “opportunity gap” thus does not place
responsibility on students for systemic injustices. See Theresa Mooney, Why We
Say ‘Opportunity Gap’ Instead of ‘Achievement Gap,’ TEACH FOR AMERICA (May
11, 2018), https://www.teachforamerica.org/stories/why-we-say-opportunity-gapinstead-of-achievement-gap; see also Camika Royal, Please Stop Using the Phrase
‘Achievement Gap,’ GOOD (Nov. 10, 2012), https://www.good.is/articles/pleasestop-using-the-phrase-achievement-gap.
5. Robinson, supra note 4, at 961. As the wealth gap has increased between
low-income and high-income families, the opportunity gap between children in
low-income and high-income families has also widened. Id. at 962.
6. Rui Diemart, 32 Million American Adults Can’t Read: Why Literacy is the
Key
to
Growth,
MEDIUM
(Feb.
16,
2018),
https://medium.com/
@OneYoungWorld_/32-million-american-adults-cant-read-why-literacy-is-thekey-to-growth-818996739523; The Editorial Team, Crisis Point: The State of
Literacy in America, RESILIENT EDUCATOR (last visited July 10, 2020),
https://resilienteducator.com/news/illiteracy-in-america/.
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Education and the National Institute of Literacy,
approximately thirty-two million adults in the United States
cannot read.7 The children of parents who have low literacy
levels are especially vulnerable, as those students have a
seventy-two percent chance of reading at the lowest levels
themselves.8 Furthermore, seventy-five percent of state
prison inmates can be classified as low literate.9
Teachers and school administrators will not exclusively
solve this literacy crisis within the classroom. State
legislatures and political majorities will also not solve these
issues alone, as they have proven inept at urgently
addressing this educational crisis.10 Rather, solving this
problem requires merging the worlds of education policy and
judicial reform. A recent civil lawsuit stemming out of poor
school conditions in Detroit Public Schools sought to provide
a legal solution to the problem. This case, Gary B. v. Snyder,
serves as a starting point to the issue of whether access to
literacy is a fundamental right.
Given the absence of federal precedent regarding a right
to literacy, Gary B. v. Snyder raised a novel issue.11 The
seven student plaintiffs in this class action suit argued that
decades of deliberate indifference to Detroit schools denied
them and other children access to literacy, the most basic

7. Diemart, supra note 6.
8. The Editorial Team, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. See Nancy Kaffer, Whitmer Settled the Detroit Literacy Lawsuit. What
That Means (and What it Doesn’t), DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 15, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-kaffer/2020/05/15/detroitschools-right-read-literacy-lawsuit/5191807002/ (“But these are the justifications
that enabled Detroit schools’ long decline: The idea that Detroit schools’ failures
are the moral failings of individual Detroiters, students, and parents, and not the
predictable result of a system designed to fail—a school system in which none of
the state lawmakers responsible for that design would enroll their own
children.”).
11. Jacey Fortin, “Access to Literacy” Is Not a Constitutional Right, Judge in
Detroit Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/07/04/education/detroit-public-schools-education.html.
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building block of education.12 When the plaintiffs originally
filed the lawsuit in 2016, the defendants in this suit were
various government officials, including former Michigan
Governor Rick Snyder and members of the Michigan State
Board of Education.13
On June 29, 2018, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss and held that the students at poorly
performing public schools in Detroit lacked a fundamental
right of access to literacy under the Constitution.14 Judge
Stephen Murphy’s decision15 agreed that state officials bore
some responsibility for the dismal quality of education in the
district.16 The court also agreed that giving students the
opportunity to read was necessary for voting, applying for a
job, and securing a place to live.17 Nonetheless, according to
the decision, “those points do not necessarily make access to
literacy a fundamental right.”18
When the plaintiffs appealed the result to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Governor Snyder’s successor,
Gretchen Whitmer, became the new named defendant. On
April 23, 2020, in a groundbreaking decision, a three-judge
Sixth Circuit panel recognized a fundamental right to access
to literacy.19 This marked the first time in history a federal
court acknowledged a right to a basic minimum education.
However, the result was short-lived, as a majority of Sixth

12. Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
13. Id. at 856.
14. Id. at 857.
15. Although this case occurred within the Sixth Circuit, the arguments in
this Comment are applicable to and may help federal court litigants and judges
in other circuits.
16. See Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 872–73.
17. Id. at 873.
18. Id.
19. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 649 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated en banc,
958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem).
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Circuit judges voted to rehear the case en banc, effectively
vacating the panel decision. As a result, there is once again
no binding precedent establishing a right to access literacy.
This Comment argues that the United States
Constitution guarantees the opportunity to become literate.
Specifically, this Comment shows how the District Court’s
analysis faltered, and presents arguments future litigants
should consider. Part I discusses the crucial Supreme Court
precedents that set the stage for current education litigation.
Part I also presents a realistic federal standard for access to
literacy that diverts from the standard the Gary B. litigants
proposed to the District Court. Part II of this Comment
argues that the Due Process Clause guarantees access to
literacy because Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly
emphasized literacy’s importance to society, and literacy is a
significant piece of American history and tradition. Finally,
Part III discusses the judicial implications of recognizing a
right to access literacy, and the repercussions that would
result in federal courts and state legislatures throughout the
nation.
Disadvantaged communities are in need of legal
intervention. Otherwise, the policies of state legislatures and
political majorities will continue to dictate the educational
opportunities of these communities, and will continue to fail
our students and their families.20 The right to literacy is a
natural extension of existing Supreme Court educational
policy concerns. The Court’s repeated emphasis on
education’s importance suggests “an openness to extending
some level of constitutional protection to education or, at
least, an unwillingness to foreclose the possibility.”21 Now is
the time to extend the possibility the Court has already
acknowledged. This Comment shows how this possibility
may become a reality.

20. Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education,
70 STAN. L. REV. 735, 739 (2018) [hereinafter Constitutional Compromise].
21. Id. at 740.
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SETTING THE STAGE FOR ACCESS TO LITERACY

Part I lays out the crucial education cases that set the
stage for the ongoing right to literacy litigation. These cases
open the door to establishing a fundamental right to access
to literacy. In fact, as the District Court in the Gary B. case
reasoned, “the Supreme Court has neither confirmed nor
denied that access to literacy is a fundamental right. The
Court must therefore cautiously take up the task.”22 Part I
also discusses the Gary B. litigation and addresses why the
federal government is better equipped than state and local
governments to answer the question whether access to
literacy is a fundamental right. Finally, Part I shows how
litigants must clearly define a uniform, federal standard of
education, as none currently exists. This Part argues that
literacy access should be the federal floor of educational
quality, and argues that adequate school infrastructure
should not be part of a federal literacy standard.
A. How we got here: The Supreme Court’s right-to-education
precedent
In order to establish a federal right to access to literacy,
it is necessary to examine a series of Supreme Court cases
that shaped how courts evaluate constitutional claims
concerning state-provided education. The Equal Protection
Clause dominates most of this education law precedent,
which leaves “ample space” for the Supreme Court to find a
right to access to literacy within the Due Process Clause.23
The Sixth Circuit and the District Court in Gary B. heavily
discussed and relied upon this precedent in arriving at a
decision.24 Both courts used this Supreme Court precedent
as evidence that a right to a general education is distinct
from a right to a minimally adequate education, and that the

22. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 871.
23. Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 117.
24. See Whitmer, 957 F.3d at 634; Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 868–71.
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Supreme Court has never determined whether a minimally
adequate education is a fundamental right.25 Despite this
shared reliance upon Supreme Court precedent, the courts
arrived at opposite conclusions, as the Sixth Circuit
ultimately recognized a fundamental right to access literacy,
while the District Court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ claims.
The case of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez26 remains one of the most consequential cases
within the realm of education and constitutional law.27 As a
result of Rodriguez, the Supreme Court essentially punted
authority for educational funding back to the states.28 Going
forward, the legal presumption in federal courts would be
that the state’s actions regarding educational funding were
constitutional.29 Nearly fifty years after the Court decided
Rodriguez, ongoing education litigation continues to feel the
repercussions of the decision. The holding reflected the
Supreme Court’s discomfort with prioritizing equal
protection concerns over a state’s interest in local control
over education.30 The decision asserted the importance of
local control, and set up a roadblock to bringing federal
claims of educational inequity.31 It ultimately took litigators
out of the business of going to federal court to resolve

25. See Whitmer, 957 F.3d at 644; Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 868–71.
26. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
27. See PAUL A. SRACIC, SAN ANTONIO V. RODRIGUEZ AND THE PURSUIT OF EQUAL
EDUCATION: THE DEBATE OVER DISCRIMINATION AND SCHOOL FUNDING 2 (Peter
Charles Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull eds., 2006) (“What stands out about Rodriguez,
however, is not just that it addresses the subjects of education, politics, wealth,
and race, but rather the curious way in which all four of these topics interact
within the case. In fact, it is the way that the Supreme Court ultimately
understands this relationship that makes Rodriguez a landmark case in U.S. law
and society.”).
28. Id. at 141.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See A Right to Learn?: Improving Educational Outcomes Through
Substantive Due Process, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2007) [hereinafter
Improving Educational Outcomes].
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educational quality issues.32 Litigants thus looked for a
solution within state constitutions and brought claims based
on state education and equal protection clauses.33
In Rodriguez, plaintiff parents brought a class action suit
on behalf of their children, and disputed Texas’s funding
method for public schools.34 Every state in the nation except
Hawaii used local funding and local property taxes to pay for
education, but in districts with higher property values,
schools were predictably funded at significantly higher rates
than other districts.35 States’ heavy reliance on property
taxes when funding school districts has often led to a vast
difference between what the richest and poorest school
districts receive.36 As a result, students from one of the
lowest-funded school districts argued the funding scheme
violated the Equal Protection Clause.37
The Supreme Court disagreed and, in a 5-4 decision,
turned away the student plaintiffs’ claims.38 First, the Court
applied rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny,
because education is not a fundamental right and wealth is

32. Carter G. Phillips, A Class Action Lawsuit for the Right to a Minimum
Education in Detroit, 15 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 412, 414 (2020).
33. See Improving Educational Outcomes, supra note 31, at 1326 (“The
theories behind these lawsuits have varied, with litigants seeking either the
equalization of resources or sufficient funding to provide an adequate level of
education. Results have been mixed . . . .”).
34. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 8–17 (1973);
Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 117.
35. Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 868 (E.D. Mich. 2018); SRACIC,
supra note 27, at 1.
36. Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 117.
37. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 8–17; Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 868; SRACIC,
supra note 27, at 2 (describing how in the Rodriguez case, Demetrio Rodriguez
and six other parents of children who attended school in the poor, overwhelmingly
Mexican-American Edgewood section of San Antonio filed suit in federal court
arguing that the Texas funding system violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
38. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41.
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not a suspect classification.39 The author of the majority
opinion, Justice Louis Powell,40 emphasized the fact that the
plaintiffs articulated a positive right,41 not a negative one,
and stated: “[e]ducation, of course, is not among the rights
afforded
explicit
protection
under
our
Federal
42
Constitution.” Then, the Court reaffirmed that the state
had a legitimate interest in ensuring that local governments
maintained the power and flexibility to devise their own
taxation schemes.43 The Court therefore concluded that the
state’s school-funding system was rationally related to that
legitimate interest.44
However, when the Court decided Rodriguez in 1973, it
failed to determine whether the deprivation of literacy access
would violate the Due Process Clause.45 The Rodriguez Court
never answered the question whether there was a federal
39. Id. at 40–44; Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 868.
40. Justice Powell, the author of the majority opinion in Rodriguez, was raised
in an aristocratic family in the South. Powell attended Washington and Lee
University in Lexington, Virginia. Lexington is in the midst of the old
Confederacy, and the remains of the University’s namesake, General Robert E.
Lee, can be found there. SRACIC, supra note 27, at 111.
41. See infra Part III.
42. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35; Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 117–18.
43. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55 (“We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a
level of wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational
authorities in 50 States, especially where the alternatives proposed are only
recently conceived and nowhere yet tested.”); Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 868.
44. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55. Notably, the most prominent dissent came from
an expected author: Justice Thurgood Marshall. Part II of this Comment
discusses Justice Marshall’s dissent in greater detail. Justice Marshall
interpreted this case very differently than the majority. He wrote, “The Court’s
suggestions of legislative redress and experimentation will doubtless be of great
comfort to the schoolchildren of Texas’s disadvantaged districts, but considering
the vested interests of wealthy school districts in the preservation of the status
quo, they are worth little more.” Id. at 132 (Marshall, J., dissenting); SRACIC,
supra note 27, at 110.
45. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36–37 (“Even if it were conceded that some
identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to
the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present
levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls
short.”); see also Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 870.
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right to an education of a minimum level of quality.46 The
plaintiffs in the Gary B. case sought an answer to this
question.47 Gary B. thus focused on this crucial gap in
Supreme Court doctrine: the question of whether there is a
federal constitutional floor regarding educational quality.48
The Gary B. plaintiffs argued there is a bare minimum level
of education which must be provided, and that substantive
floor is access to literacy.49 The plaintiffs’ theory also largely
relied on the Court’s subsequent decision in Plyler v. Doe.50
Nine years after Rodriguez, the Court considered Plyler
v. Doe, another case from Texas.51 Plyler indicated that the
Court is uncomfortable with completely denying education to
a class of children.52 In fact, the plaintiffs in Gary B.
primarily relied on the Plyler decision specifically because
the holding left the door open to recognizing some sort of
constitutional floor of adequate education.53 In Plyler, the
46. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. See Kristine L. Bowman, Education Reform
and Detroit’s Right to Literacy Litigation, 75 WASH & LEE L. REV. 61, 63 (2018).
47. See Class Action Compl. at 23–25, Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852
(E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 16-CV-13292); Bowman, supra note 46, at 62.
48. Bowman, supra note 46, at 63.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 64.
51. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
52. See id. at 221–23 (holding that the school district could not exclude
undocumented immigrant students because to do so would deny those children
“the means and skills” necessary to become productive members of society and
thus create a “permanent underclass”); Improving Educational Outcomes, supra
note 31, at 1326.
53. See Class Action Compl., supra note 47, at 14–16. The plaintiffs in the
Michigan Gary B. case contended that the basic holding of Plyler “stands apart
from the fact that the children denied access to basic education lacked lawful
immigration status.” According to the Gary B. plaintiffs, if the Court
acknowledged that undocumented children could not be barred from receiving a
basic education, there should be an even stronger basis for acknowledging that
American citizens could not be barred from receiving a basic education. See id.
At oral argument before the District Court in the Gary B. case, the plaintiffs’
counsel argued they were making an analogous claim to the Plyer plaintiffs. The
Gary B. plaintiffs alleged that “having a system that does not provide teachers,
books, courses, and the conditions conducive to learning fails even a rational basis
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Court addressed the constitutional implications of an
absolute denial of public education.54 This case involved a
challenge to a Texas law denying children of undocumented
immigrants access to public schools.55 The Court held that
the Texas statute’s absolute denial of education was
unconstitutional.56 The Court reasoned “[the statute]
imposes a lifetime hardship . . . . By denying these children
a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the
structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic
possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way
to the progress of our Nation.”57 Despite finding the statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court cited
Rodriguez and reiterated that “public education is not a
‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution.”58
Nevertheless, even though the Plyler Court declined to hold
that education is a fundamental right under its equal
protection jurisprudence, this holding suggested that a
minimally adequate education might be constitutionally
required.59

test.” Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 870. However, the District Court did not agree
with this analysis, because the Gary B. plaintiffs were not challenging a specific
Michigan statute in the same way that the Plyler plaintiffs challenged a Texas
statute. See id. at 870–71. The District Court thus distinguished the Gary B. and
Plyler plaintiffs because the Gary B. plaintiffs reached their conclusion by
alleging that the defendants had not done enough to provide a basic education.
See id. at 870. On the other hand, the District Court reasoned that the Plyler
plaintiffs showed that the defendants had not provided them with even a basic,
minimal education. Id.
54. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202; see also Improving Educational Outcomes,
supra note 31, at 1325–26.
55. In Plyler, the Court struck down a statute that denied public school
enrollment to children of undocumented immigrants. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; see
Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 118.
56. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; Improving Educational Outcomes, supra note 31,
at 1326.
57. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223; Improving Educational Outcomes, supra note
31, at 1326.
58. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221, 230; Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 118.
59. Improving Educational Outcomes, supra note 31, at 1326.
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Four years later, the Court decided Papasan v. Allain, a
case from Mississippi.60 The Papasan decision continued to
show the Court’s inability to definitively answer the
constitutional questions concerning a minimally adequate
education. In Papasan, the Court framed the question like
this: “Given that the State has title to assets granted to it by
the Federal Government for the use of the State’s schools,
does the Equal Protection Clause permit it to distribute the
benefit of these assets unequally among the school districts
as it now does?”61 Ultimately, the Court in Papasan
remanded the case, and the terms of the Court’s remand
prevented a holding on the equal protection claim.62
However, the Papasan Court notably stated, “[the Court] has
not yet definitively settled the questions whether a
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and
whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that
right should be accorded heightened equal protection
review.”63 Papasan is further proof that the Supreme Court
has had a difficult time “closing the book on a right to
education.”64
Similarly, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools 65
continued to leave open the question whether there is a
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. In
Kadrmas, the Court upheld a state law permitting school
districts to require parents to pay part of the cost of
transporting their kids to school.66 At the time, North Dakota
permitted some school districts to charge a user fee for bus
transportation.67 A student of modest means refused to pay
60. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
61. Id. at 289.
62. See id. at 285–86; Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 871.
63. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285.
64. Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 118.
65. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
66. Id. at 452.
67. Id. at 453.
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the transportation fee and claimed the law violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it deprived students who
could not afford to pay the fee “minimum access to
education.”68 In response, the Supreme Court explained, “[i]t
is difficult to imagine why choosing to offer the service should
entail a constitutional obligation to offer it for free.”69 The
Court reasoned that the student was not denied access to
education, but rather she was merely burdened in securing
it.70 The Court concluded that the North Dakota statute
neither discriminated against a suspect class nor interfered
with a fundamental right.71 Therefore, the Court determined
the statute was not subject to strict scrutiny and satisfied
rational basis review.72
Thus, the question of whether access to literacy is a
fundamental right remains a question the Supreme Court
has neither confirmed nor denied.73 Notably, Justice
Marshall’s Kadrmas dissent cited the Rodriguez, Plyler, and
Papasan cases upon which the Court had relied.74 Justice
Marshall stated:
[t]he Court therefore does not address the question whether a
State constitutionally could deny a child access to a minimally
adequate education. In prior cases, this Court explicitly has left
open the question whether such a deprivation of access would
violate a fundamental constitutional right. That question remains
open today.75

68. Id. at 458; Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 869 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
69. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462.
70. Id. at 458; Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 871.
71. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 465.
72. Id.
73. See Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 642 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated en
banc, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem); Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 871.
74. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 466 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Snyder, 313 F.
Supp. 3d at 870.
75. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 466 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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B. The Gary B. Litigation
The Gary B. litigation illustrates how it is possible for
litigants bringing this novel constitutional issue to be
successful before federal courts, yet the issue of whether a
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right is far
from resolved. The Sixth Circuit’s decision to rehear the case
en banc and vacate the panel decision may encourage courts
within other circuits to follow the District Court and the
panel dissent’s reasoning, which did not find a right to access
literacy. Furthermore, the settlement agreement between
the student plaintiffs and Governor Whitmer is a temporary
solution that will likely not serve long-term student
interests.
In 2016, students at several of Detroit’s worstperforming public schools sued several Michigan state
officials, who they argued were responsible for the abysmal
conditions in their schools.76 The student plaintiffs credited
this substandard performance to poor conditions within their
classrooms, including missing or unqualified teachers,
physically dangerous facilities, and inadequate books and
materials.77 The students argued these conditions deprived
them of a basic minimum education, meaning one that
provides a chance at foundational literacy, and brought forth
three claims. First, the plaintiffs argued that while other
Michigan students receive an adequate education, the
students in plaintiffs’ schools do not, which is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.78 Secondly, they argued that
the schools they are forced to attend are schools in name
only, and so the state cannot justify the restriction on their
liberty imposed by compulsory attendance.79 Finally, the
plaintiffs asked the District Court to recognize a

76. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 856.
77. Id. at 863.
78. Id. at 875.
79. Id. at 873.
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fundamental right to access to literacy under the Due
Process Clause.80 In response, the defendants argued access
to literacy is a proxy for a right to education, which has been
rejected as a fundamental right.81
While the District Court agreed the defendants were the
proper parties to sue, it dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint
on the merits.82 The court found the plaintiffs had not alleged
a proper comparator for their equal protection claim, nor had
they highlighted any state policy or action that was not
supported by a rational basis.83 It also found the plaintiffs
did not sufficiently plead their compulsory attendance
theory.84 When the court addressed the plaintiffs’ due
process claim, it ultimately found there was no fundamental
right to access to literacy and granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss.85
On appeal to a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit, the
court affirmed in part and reversed in part the District
Court’s decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.86 On April 23, 2020, in a 2-1 decision, the Sixth
Circuit agreed the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead their
equal protection and compulsory attendance claims, but
disagreed with the lower court’s reasoning concerning the
plaintiffs’ due process claim.87 As a result, the court
recognized a fundamental right to access to literacy.88 The
court described this as a “limited right,” which promised only

80. Id. at 856.
81. See id. at 856–57.
82. Id. at 857.
83. Id. at 876–77.
84. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated en banc,
958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem).
85. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 875–77.
86. Whitmer, 957 F.3d at 621.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 662.
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an education sufficient to provide “basic” access to literacy.89
In addition to recognizing a right to access literacy, the court
held the plaintiffs had “plausibly been deprived of an
education that could provide access to literacy.”90 Even
though the plaintiffs still faced the burden of proving their
factual contentions at trial, under the standards governing a
motion to dismiss, this was enough “to get them through the
courthouse doors.”91 Judge Eric Clay delivered the court’s
opinion in which Judge Jane Stranch joined, and Judge Eric
Murphy delivered a separate dissenting opinion.92
The appellate court’s two main points regarding the due
process claim were that the state provision of a basic
minimum education has a longstanding presence in our
history and tradition, and is essential to our concept of
ordered constitutional liberty.93 The court discussed how the
history of American public education reveals a longstanding
practice of free state-sponsored schools, because at the time
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, schools were
ubiquitous.94 The court also reasoned that basic literacy
education is essential to the exercise of other fundamental
rights, such as rights of speech, press, and participation in
the political process.95 The court also considered the unique
role of public education as a source of opportunity separate
from the means of a child’s parents.96 According to the court,
this unique role creates a heightened social burden to
provide at least a minimal education, and thus, “the

89. Id. at 660.
90. Id. at 661.
91. Id. at 662.
92. Id. at 620.
93. Id. at 649. This overview of the Gary B. litigation focuses on the plaintiffs’
substantive due process claim, instead of their equal protection and compulsory
attendance claims.
94. Id. at 648.
95. Id. at 649, 653.
96. Id. at 649.
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exclusion of a child from a meaningful education by no fault
of her own should be viewed as especially suspect.”97
Furthermore, the court addressed some arguments
against recognizing this fundamental right.98 The court
characterized these arguments of the defendants and the
dissent as “classic” arguments against extending substantive
due process.99 The court acknowledged the counterargument
that political branches are better equipped to address
general social wrongs, and courts must not act as superlegislatures.100 In response, the court reasoned the affected
group—students and families of students without access to
literacy—is especially vulnerable and faces a built-in
disadvantage at seeking political recourse.101 This lack of
literacy is what prevents them from obtaining a basic
minimal education through the normal political process,
which increases the justification for the recognition of the
right as fundamental.102 The court also addressed the
argument that the Due Process Clause provides only
negative, not positive rights.103 In response, the Sixth Circuit
focused on how the Supreme Court has recognized
affirmative fundamental rights.104 The court reasoned that
one affirmative right repeatedly endorsed by the Court is the
fundamental right to marry.105 At the very least, the
recognition of marriage as a state-provided right shows that
the Constitution does not categorically rule out the existence
of positive rights.106
97. Id.
98. Id. at 655.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 656.
103. Id. at 655–56.
104. Id. at 656.
105. Id. at 656–57.
106. Id. at 657
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Nevertheless, Judge Eric Murphy delivered a dissenting
opinion. The dissent argued the state legislature and local
school boards are better equipped than federal courts to
address serious educational problems.107 The dissent also
described access to literacy as a “nebulous” right, and stated
that public education is not a right granted to individuals by
the Constitution.108 The dissent also reasoned a positive
right to a minimum education will jumble the separation of
powers.109 As a result, this would impede upon the states’
ability to experiment with diverse solutions to challenging
policy problems.110 Thus, the dissent would have affirmed
the lower court’s judgment.
After over four years of litigation, on May 14, 2020, the
student plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with
Governor Whitmer.111 Even though this settlement will
directly benefit the seven individual student plaintiffs, it is
unclear whether the agreement will impact more students
and ensure long-term access to literacy. The settlement
agreed to provide $280,000 to the seven plaintiffs to access a
high-quality literacy program or otherwise further their
education.112 The agreement also created two Detroit-based
task forces to monitor the quality of education in Detroit and
advise the governor.113 The Detroit Literacy Equity Task
Force will operate outside state government, conducting
yearly evaluations around literacy in Detroit and providing
state-level policy recommendations to the governor.114

107. Id. at 662 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 663.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Terms for Settlement Agreement Release Between All Plaintiffs and the
Governor of the State of Michigan in Gary B. et al. v. Whitmer, et al., at 1 (dated
May 13, 2020).
112. Id. at 3.
113. Id. at 4–5.
114. Id. at 4.

2020]

ACCESS TO LITERACY

1233

Students,
parents,
literacy
experts,
teachers,
a
paraprofessional, and other community members will serve
on the task force.115 The Detroit Educational Policy
Committee will focus on the stability and quality of the
overall educational ecosystem in Detroit, accessibility of
quality schools for all children in Detroit, and improvements
in facilities, teaching, and educational materials.116
Yet, instead of fostering significant, long-term change
within Detroit, the settlement will likely only have a
temporary impact. For example, the terms of the agreement
specifically state the Governor will diligently propose and
support legislation before the end of her first term in office
and, “if the legislation is not enacted and if she is re-elected
to a second term, also during her second term of office.”117 If
enacted, the legislation would provide the Detroit Public
School Community District with at least $94.4 million of
funding for literacy-related programs and initiatives.118
While this funding would certainly have a significant impact
on student literacy opportunities, the Governor’s support
does not guarantee an approval from Michigan’s Republicanled legislature. After all, this is the same legislature that
asked the Sixth Circuit to reconsider the Gary B. v. Whitmer
decision.119 The legislature called the decision a “precedentsetting error of grave and exceptional public importance.”120
There is a serious possibility the legislation will never be
enacted, even if Governor Whitmer is elected to a second
term. Thus, the settlement has yet to prove to be an effective,
long-lasting solution in addressing the literacy crisis.

115. Id.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Koby Levin, GOP Lawmakers Want Judges to Review Detroit Literacy
Case, CHALKBEAT (May 13, 2020, 6:13 PM), https://detroit.chalkbeat.org/
2020/5/13/21257962/gop-lawmakers-review-detroit-literacy-case.
120. Id.
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In addition to the uncertainties surrounding the
settlement, a majority of Sixth Circuit judges voted to rehear
the Gary B. v. Whitmer case. This decision to rehear the case
en banc creates an even greater sense of urgency to recognize
literacy as a fundamental right, both within and outside the
Sixth Circuit. As a result of initiating the en banc procedure,
the Whitmer decision is now vacated, and is no longer
binding precedent.121 The en banc court essentially reversed
the panel decision, a devastating result for students, who are
once again denied the guarantee of a minimum quality
education. This decision did not impact the settlement
agreement between the Governor and the individual
plaintiffs, but it completely abolished the legal precedent
that was set by the earlier panel decision. Furthermore, on
June 10, 2020, the en banc Sixth Circuit dismissed the case
as moot, based on the settlement agreement.122 Even though
this dismissal marks the end of the Gary B. litigation,
litigants in other federal circuits should continue to bring
similar “right to access literacy” cases. Even though the
recognition of this right in the Sixth Circuit was short lived,
the well-reasoned, thorough panel decision reveals it is
possible for litigants to achieve victory in federal court.
C. The federal government is better equipped than local and
state governments to answer the question of whether
access to literacy is a fundamental right
The federal government must shoulder greater
responsibility over education to address the opportunity gap
and the national literacy crisis, as it has already increased
its influence in the educational sphere. In the United States,
state and local governments have exercised much more

121. Koby Levin et al., In a Blow to the ‘Right to Read,’ Full Appeals Court Will
Review Detroit Literacy Lawsuit, CHALKBEAT (May 19, 2020, 7:10 PM),
https://detroit.chalkbeat.org/2020/5/19/21264371/appeals-court-will-reviewdetroit-lawsuit.
122. Gary B. v. Whitmer, Nos. 18-1855/1871, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18312, at
*10 (6th Cir. June 10, 2020).
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control over public schools than the federal government.123
The reason for this limited federal role is because of the
Constitution’s Tenth Amendment, which states that “the
powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively.”124
However, the Supreme Court relies on evolving federal
practice to identify due process rights and “discern
commitments
so
deeply
engrained
in
American
consciousness that they must be recognized as de facto
constitutional.”125 Thus, the primary responsibility for
education has shifted in important ways to the federal
government, with support from both Democratic and
Republican administrations.126 In addition, there has been
increased public belief that the federal government must
protect the right to education.127 In fact, the United States
123. Robinson, supra note 4, at 968–69 (arguing that a strengthening of the
federal role in education will reduce some forms of state and local control over
education, but will also provide states and localities new forms of control); see
U.S. Department of Education, The Federal Role in Education,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (explaining how state and
local governments are primarily responsible for education in the United States).
124. Robinson, supra note 4, at 969; Brendan Pelsue, When it Comes to
Education, the Federal Government is in Charge of…Um, What?, HARV. ED. MAG.,
https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/ed/17/08/when-it-comes-education-federalgovernment-charge-um-what.
125. Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 133.
126. Id. See Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with
Equal Protection: The First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected
Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2010) [hereinafter Unlocking the Power
of State Constitutions] (arguing that given states’ weakened ability to enforce
equal protection rights, the future of education equity depends on federal
intervention).
127. Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 133; Unlocking the Power of State
Constitutions, supra note 126, at 1346–47 (emphasizing that many Americans
already assume that education is a constitutional or civil right protected by the
federal government, even though this is not our current reality). See, e.g., Ting
Yu, Searching for a Third Way to Measure Success, TEACH FOR AMERICA (Feb. 27,
2019),
https://www.teachforamerica.org/stories/searching-for-a-third-way-tomeasure-success?utm_source=email_mktg_email&utm_medium=Owned&utm_
campaign=MKTG_2019.02.28_MP_WinterOneDayEmail_Alumni&utm_term=0
2.28.2019&utm_content=BeyondMathArticleTitle (“Without broad access to the
sciences, civics, arts, world languages, computer science, and the habits of critical
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stands apart from most other countries, where the
responsibility for education does not lie at the local level.128
Over the last few decades, the federal role in education
has grown significantly.129 In 1965, after the Brown v. Board
of Education decision,130 Congress passed the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”), which increased
federal responsibility for equal educational opportunity.131
Congress further expanded the federal role in education
through the passage of No Child Left Behind (“NCLB”) and
Race to the Top (“RTTT”), which encouraged higher
standards and greater accountability for the education of all
children.132 NCLB received bipartisan support, despite its
significant federal involvement in public schools.133
According to one scholar, “passage of the NCLB occurred
because both [the Democratic and Republican] parties and
the American public now realize that substantial federal

thinking, will students truly be prepared for the work force of the future? And if
not, are intensive efforts to raise math and reading scores doing enough to
advance this fundamental civil right?”).
128. Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 133.
129. Robinson, supra note 4, at 969.
130. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (requiring equality
in education when the state has chosen to provide education).
131. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10,
79 Stat. 27; Robinson, supra note 4, at 969; see also Kristi L. Bowman, The
Failure of Education Federalism, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 42 (2017) (“The
federal government’s broadest regulation of education remains the 1965
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Since its enactment, ESEA
has been reauthorized and amended roughly every five years. . . . The most wellknown rendition of the law may be the 2001 variation, the No Child Left Behind
Act (NCLB).”).
132. Robinson, supra note 4, at 969.
133. See Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 135 n.251; see also Kimberly
Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding and
Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88
N.C. L. REV. 787, 793 (2010). But see John Oliver, Standardized Testing: Last
Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (May 3, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J6lyURyVz7k (“Voting against ‘No Child Left
Behind’ is like voting against ‘No Puppy Left Un-Snuggled.’ What monster would
do that?”).
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action will be necessary to improve the nation’s schools.”134
It is clear that federal influence in education has increased
in substantial ways to local classrooms.
Local school district governance also suffers from low
community participation.135 In fact, some scholars contend
that “local control no longer exists within American
education,” because of the growing federal and state
influence over education.136 For example, in low-income
communities, community participation results in decreased
levels of influence due to residents’ lack of political power and
financial means.137 It is also difficult for parents to choose
their child’s school, due to practical limitations like distance
and transportation.138
In addition, the motivations of those in power at the local
level have not always been honorable.139 Religious
animosities, racism, and fears about curricular control fueled
local politics.140 Even though state constitutions contain an
education clause, states continue to fail to provide equal
access to the funding needed to provide all students access to
an excellent education.141 Today, there is evidence that local
control over education is receding:142
As control over education’s content, delivery, and funding
increasingly comes from the federal government—through, for
example, grants conditioned on meeting federal standards—school
districts and states not only are losing the monopoly over education,
but also their legitimacy in the public consciousness as the sole

134. Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 135 n.251 (quoting Robinson).
135. Robinson, supra note 4, at 974.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 974–75.
138. See id. at 975.
139. Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 134.
140. Id.
141. Ogletree et al., Rodriguez Reconsidered: Is There a Federal Constitutional
Right to Education?, EDUC. NEXT, Spring 2017, at 71, 72–73.
142. Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 134.
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guarantors of the education right.143

As a result, Americans increasingly believe the federal
government must exert more substantial influence over
improving educational quality in our schools.144 The federal
government should exert this substantial influence by
recognizing a federal right to a minimally adequate
education. Recognizing this right would allow the federal
government to hold states accountable for ensuring students
have access to basic resources they need to be successful in
school. The nation is thus poised for a stronger federal
response to recognize substantive education rights such as a
basic level of literacy. Education advocates should pursue
federal litigation as a strategy for improving educational
quality and equity.
Federal courts should take on a greater role in serving
as a venue for litigating educational quality. Even though
state courts have been the predominant place to bring equal
protection claims or challenge educational disparities, this
option is not nearly as effective as it has been in the past.145
Though every state’s constitution contains an education
clause guaranteeing the right to free public elementary and
secondary education, state courts are increasingly rejecting
school quality challenges.146 According to Professor Derek
Black, “Even in those instances in which plaintiffs have won
since the recession, legislatures have simply defied the
courts, refusing to comply with judicial remedies. Thus, even
when plaintiffs have received favorable judicial opinions,
they have struggled to secure victory outside court.”147 This

143. Id.
144. Id. at 134–35.
145. Bowman, supra note 131, at 10.
146. Id.
147. Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher
Shortages, and the Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U. L.
REV. 423, 427 (2016) (footnote omitted) (discussing recognition and enforcement
of rights to education); Bowman, supra note 131, at 10–11 (quoting Black).
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alarming trend of “judicial abdication” along with “legislative
inertia” and “executive inaction” at the state level is
substantially decreasing the effectiveness of state courts in
addressing issues of educational quality.148 This “minimal
government” will undoubtedly continue to increase
inequality in American public schools.149
While the solution of education reform via the federal
courts is imperfect, federal courts must step in because the
political process has failed to address the literacy crisis with
urgency. According to Professor Kristine Bowman, commonlaw change may be the most viable option for short-term
progress:150 “While courts are the backstop for legislative and
executive (and lower court) action gone awry, unlike
legislatures, they hear only issues brought to them and opine
about cases and controversies.”151 Changing federal common
law is difficult, but the benefits may be worth the struggle
because “when constitutional change is accomplished, it is
applicable nationwide and profoundly difficult to undo.”152 It
would be exceptionally difficult to pursue other solutions,
such as amending the Constitution to allow for a right to
access to literacy, because Congress cannot do this alone.
Ratification of a proposed amendment requires approval by
three-quarters of the state legislatures or state conventions.
In today’s highly politicized environment, it is completely

148. See Bowman, supra note 131, at 10–11.
149. Id. at 11.
150. Id. at 45. Notably, one of the ironies of the Rodriguez decision is that by
the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the San Antonio School District
had been dismissed as a defendant and filed a brief in support of the plaintiffsappellees. The District reversed course and advocated in favor of equal
educational opportunity for all students, instead of local control over schools.
Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 134; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Their brief argued, “Education is a fundamental
interest in every sense of the words.” Id. The Supreme Court’s failure to recognize
education as a fundamental right in Rodriguez was a missed opportunity to see
substantive education reform via the federal courts.
151. Bowman, supra note 131, at 45–46.
152. Id. at 46.
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unrealistic to imagine a federal constitutional amendment
regarding an issue over which states have exercised a
profound amount of authority.153 Even Justice Marshall, in
his Rodriguez dissent, expressed dissatisfaction with the
ability of the political process to solve issues of inequality in
education.154 This is where judicial intervention is far more
likely to succeed than an amendment through ratification. In
particular, the Court’s jurisprudence has left open the
possibility of recognizing the fundamental right to access to
literacy in substantive due process.155
D. Access to literacy should be the federal floor of
educational quality
It is clear that the Supreme Court has never definitively
answered whether students have a constitutional right to
receive an education of a certain minimum level of quality.156
In addition, the opposite conclusions from the Sixth Circuit

153. Id.
154. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 71–72 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall argued that the majority’s holding could only be seen as a “retreat” from
a commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as “unsupportable
acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their earliest years of the
chance to reach their full potential as citizens.” Id. at 70–71. He continued:
Nor can I accept the notion that it is sufficient to remit these appellees
to the vagaries of the political process which, contrary to the majority’s
suggestion, has proved singularly unsuited to the task of providing a
remedy for this discrimination. I, for one, am unsatisfied with the hope
of an ultimate “political” solution sometime in the indefinite future
while, in the meantime, countless children unjustifiably receive inferior
educations that “may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to
ever be undone.” I must therefore respectfully dissent.
Id. at 71–72 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
155. See Bowman, supra note 131, at 46; see also infra Part II (discussing this
substantive due process argument).
156. See Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 871 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (“The
Court is left to conclude that the Supreme Court has neither confirmed nor denied
that access to literacy if [sic] a fundamental right.”); Bowman, supra note 46, at
63 (“This is why Gary B. focuses on a small and incredibly important gap in
Supreme Court doctrine: The question whether there is a federal constitutional
floor regarding educational quality.”).
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panel and the District Court show how both federal and state
courts have struggled to determine exactly what a “minimum
quality education” or an “adequate education” means.
A crucial step in evaluating education litigation at both
the federal and state level is simply to understand what a
court or litigant means when saying students are entitled to
an adequate education.157 Policymakers and academic
experts have struggled with this task for years, so it is
doubtful judges would easily find a solution.158 “Adequate
education” is analogous to a “particular qualitative level of
education.”159 Yet, these are both equally vague definitions.
There is no uniform, consistent answer to the question of
what an adequate education looks like.160 Given the lack of
an education clause in the Constitution, federal courts have
struggled to define the exact meaning of an adequate
education.161 Without the benefit of any federal
constitutional text to better understand the term “adequate
education,” a federal court’s attempt to define the term would
be completely novel.162
In addition, state courts have not provided a consistent
answer by using a wide variety of terms to define an
adequate education.163 For example, the North Carolina
Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals
identified the guaranteed level of education as being a “sound

157. See Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions, supra note 126, at 1366.
158. See Note, The Misguided Appeal of a Minimally Adequate Education, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1468 (2017) [hereinafter Misguided Appeal] (“[I]t is well
settled that courts should tread lightly when asked to exercise ‘nonjudicial
discretion’ or otherwise ‘express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government.’”) (alteration in original).
159. Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions, supra note 126, at 1366.
160. See id. at 1366–67.
161. See Ogletree et al., supra note 141, at 73; Unlocking the Power of State
Constitutions, supra note 126, at 1386–87.
162. See Ogletree et al., supra note 141, at 73.
163. See Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions, supra note 126, at 1366–
67.
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basic education,” whereas New Jersey has defined it as
“thorough and efficient education,” and South Carolina a
“minimally adequate education.”164 Colorado requires a
“thorough and uniform system of free schools,” while Georgia
guarantees “an adequate education for the citizens of
Georgia.”165 Ohio mandates “a thorough and efficient system
of common schools”; Oregon identifies “a uniform, and
general system of Common schools”; Idaho requires “a
general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common
schools”; and Arizona guarantees “a general and uniform
public school system.”166 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
has defined “adequate education” in equally ambiguous
terms, including providing each student with “sufficient oral
and written communication skills to enable students to
function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization.”167
These vague standards lack clear meaning, and their
interpretation depends entirely upon whatever court defines
and applies them.168 All that courts have been able to

164. Id. at 1367 (first quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369
(N.Y. 1982); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997); then quoting
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973); and then quoting Abbeville
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999)). Specifically, the New
York Court of Appeals has defined “sound basic education” as “consist[ing] of the
basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to
eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and
serving on a jury,” Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666
(N.Y. 1995), and as providing “the opportunity for a meaningful high school
education, one which prepares them to function productively as civic
participants.” Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332
(N.Y. 2003); Misguided Appeal, supra note 158, at 1468–69.
165. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 369 n.8 (first quoting Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of
Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982); and then quoting McDaniel v. Thomas,
285 S.E.2d 156, 162 (Ga. 1981)).
166. Id. (first quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (Ohio 1979);
then quoting Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 148 (Or. 1976); then quoting Thompson
v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 636 (Idaho 1975); and then quoting Shofstall v.
Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973)).
167. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989);
Misguided Appeal, supra note 158, at 1469.
168. See Misguided Appeal, supra note 158, at 1469.

2020]

ACCESS TO LITERACY

1243

articulate is “a standard that is general and requires
intensive factual analysis to apply.”169 At the very least,
however, federal courts should recognize the one
indispensable thread that connects these varying standards
together: literacy. There is no comprehensible way that state
courts or a state constitution would ever envision a
minimally adequate education as one that fails to equip
students with age-appropriate literacy skills. State
legislators would be hard pressed to explain how a “sound
basic education” does not allow students to receive proper
access to literacy resources. Federal courts must therefore
define a minimum standard of education to mean a
curriculum that teaches students basic literacy skills.
No matter how a court or constitution defines an
“adequate education,” literacy is the constant that is
inherently present in each definition. Literacy is not only the
ability to read and write. Literacy encompasses the ability to
speak and listen “at a level that enables people to express
and understand ideas and opinions, to make decisions and
solve problems, to achieve their goals, and to participate fully
in their community and in wider society.”170 It is tied to
everything we do. Literacy is the basic foundation to build
essential skills to perform better in school, and it has a direct
impact on one’s personal growth, economic welfare, and longterm well-being.171 Amongst educators of all content areas,
the ability to read well is considered the single most

169. Id.
170. Defining Literacy, MAMHOUSTON.ORG, https://www.mamhouston.org/
literacyadvance#:~:text=Defining%20Literacy&text=Literacy%20is%20the%20a
bility%20to,community%20and%20in%20wider%20society (last visited June 14,
2020); see also Lea Shaver, The Right to Read, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 30
(2015) (“Literacy is the ability to identify, understand, interpret, create,
communicate, [and] compute, using printed and written materials associated
with varying contexts. Literacy involves a continuum of learning in enabling
individuals to achieve their goals, to develop their knowledge and potential, and
to participate fully in their community and wider society.”).
171. Diemart, supra note 6.
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important skill of the educated citizen.172
E. Adequate school infrastructure should not be part of a
federal literacy standard
Courts, legislatures, and executive agencies must
intervene immediately to find appropriate solutions to
address deteriorating school facilities within American
schools. However, “adequate school facilities” should not be
part of a federal standard for literacy. Simply put, an “access
to literacy” definition that includes “adequate school
facilities” is trying to solve too many problems at once.
Therefore, litigants in other circuits who are eager to bring
similar constitutional claims should not argue that “access to
literacy” requires school districts or states to “intervene” to
address deplorable school conditions. A federal standard for
literacy and plaintiffs’ requested relief should not include
any mention of school infrastructure or school facilities. This
standard would be too broad, and may make courts hesitant
to grant such expansive relief.
In an attempt to more clearly define a standard for
literacy, the plaintiffs in the Gary B. litigation argued that
“access to literacy” requires several components.173 As part
of their requested injunctive relief, the plaintiffs asked that
defendants and their officers, agents, and employees
implement evidence-based programs for literacy instruction
and intervention, and establish a system of statewide
accountability to ensure plaintiffs have the opportunity to
attain literacy.174 The plaintiffs’ proposed system of
statewide accountability would have required the state to
“monitor[ ] conditions that deny access to literacy, taking into
account the identified conditions antithetical to literacy
instruction in Plaintiffs’ schools, such as insufficient teacher

172. DOUG LEMOV, TEACH LIKE A CHAMPION: 62 TECHNIQUES THAT PUT
STUDENTS ON THE PATH TO COLLEGE 181 (Uncommon Schools ed., 2d ed. 2015).
173. See Class Action Compl., supra note 47, at 128–29.
174. Id.
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capacity, deplorable school conditions, and failure to promote
learning readiness through trauma-informed practices.”175
This proposed system of accountability would have also
required the state to “intervene in a timely manner to address
identified conditions that deny access to literacy.”176
The plaintiffs’ 133-page complaint described the
deplorable conditions of Detroit Public Schools in great
detail. The complaint addressed everything from damaged,
out-of-date textbooks to malfunctioning heating and airconditioning systems and broken playground equipment.177
The complaint also alleged insufficient instructional
materials and technology, an absence of the resources
necessary to address student trauma and social-emotional
health, a shortage of full-time teachers, and a lack of
targeted remediation instruction for students who have
failed to achieve basic literacy skills.178 In particular, the
plaintiffs emphasized Detroit Public Schools’ insufficient and
inappropriate school facilities, including how the physical
conditions of school buildings are decrepit and dangerous.179
For example, school buildings have broken windows and
doors, fire alarms remain broken for long periods of time,
students drink from unsafe water fountains, playground
equipment is frequently broken and not age appropriate,
students find bullets and dead vermin on the playground,
hallway floors are littered with fallen ceiling tiles, water
leaks from hallway ceilings, potholes riddle school parking
lots, and mold grows in classrooms.180 It is unacceptable that
in 2020, these conditions are the everyday reality of
thousands of students in the United States. These deplorable
school conditions are not illustrative of a safe or comfortable

175. Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 78, 87–90.
178. Id. at 75–80, 95–96, 98–99.
179. Id. at 89.
180. Id. at 89–94.
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learning environment.
Even though the Sixth Circuit originally recognized a
right to access literacy, the court did not define the right’s
exact parameters. At that stage of the litigation—a motion to
dismiss in which no evidence had been discovered or
presented—the court reasoned it would be difficult to define
the limits of what constitutes a basic minimum education
sufficient to provide such access.181 Nevertheless, the court
provided a guide for the parties and the district court if
litigation continued.182 The court explained that the
educational infrastructure seems to include at least three
basic components: facilities, teaching, and educational
materials such as books.183 The court did not mandate these
components be included in a federal literacy standard, and
explained this was still a question of fact entrusted to the
trial court.184 However, as the parties settled the Gary B.
litigation, the lower court will not have this opportunity to
define the exact “access to literacy” parameters, which leaves
this question open for all federal courts.
School infrastructure should not be part of a federal
standard for literacy because crumbling school facilities have
already proven to be an entirely separate, highly expensive
issue.185 Detroit Public Schools faces nearly $543 million in

181. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 659 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated en banc,
958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem).
182. Id. at 659–60.
183. Id. at 660.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE
REPORT CARD: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE,
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2017Infrastructure-Report-Card.pdf; Jennifer Chambers, Detroit Schools Face Tough
Choices with Too Many Repairs, Not Enough Money, THE DETROIT NEWS (Apr. 30,
2019,
10:45
PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroitcity/2019/04/29/detroit-schools-face-tough-choices-too-many-repairs-not-enoughmoney/3232674002/; Erin Einhorn, Crumbling Detroit School Buildings Will Cost
$500 Million to Repair. It’s Money the District Doesn’t Have, CHALKBEAT (June
22, 2018, 12:38 PM), https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/detroit/2018/06/22/
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repairs, and waiting a few more years to deal with the poor
building conditions will only cause the price to increase to
nearly $1.5 billion.186 Detroit is not the only city currently
facing crumbling school infrastructure. Baltimore students
have faced freezing classroom temperatures, and it will take
years to fix the schools of Puerto Rico in the aftermath of
Hurricane Maria.187 A recent assessment by the American
Society of Civil Engineers (“ASCE”), confirms that American
public schools are falling apart.188 The ASCE gave the
country’s school infrastructure a D+ grade on its
Infrastructure Report Card, and found that more than fiftythree percent of schools would need to make investments
towards repairs, renovations, and modernizations to be
considered in “good” condition.189
Furthermore, school funding varies widely by state, but
the federal government contributes little to no funding for
the nation’s K-12 educational facilities.190 Even though
school districts collectively invested around $49 billion per
crumbling-detroit-school-buildings-will-cost-500-million-to-repair-its-moneythe-district-doesnt-have/; Lori Higgins, Cost to Fix Detroit School Buildings: $500
Million,
DETROIT
FREE
PRESS
(June
22,
2018,
12:00
PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/education/2018/06/22/detroit-school-buildingconditions-cost/724970002/; Todd Kominiak, America’s School Buildings are
Failing. Here’s How to Make the Case for Change, TRUST ED. (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://www.k12insight.com/trusted/americas-school-buildings-infrastructure/;
Laura Jimenez, The Case for Federal Funding for School Infrastructure, CENTER
FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/education-k-12/reports/2019/02/12/466104/case-federal-funding-schoolinfrastructure/.
186. Chambers, supra note 185. This $1.5 billion figure is based off an
assessment by the engineering consulting firm OHM Advisors. Id.
187. John Bacon, Outrage in Baltimore After Kids Huddle in Freezing
Classrooms, USA TODAY (Jan. 4, 2018, 3:33 PM), https://www.usa
today.com/story/news/nation/2018/01/04/outrage-baltimore-after-kids-huddlefreezing-classrooms/1004530001/; Merrit Kennedy, The Monumental Task of
Reopening Puerto Rico’s Schools, NPR (Oct. 12, 2017, 9:41 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/10/12/556953509/puerto-rico-s-secretaryof-education-says-its-schools-are-connecting-communities.
188. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, supra note 185, at 81–82.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 82.
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year in school facilities from 2011 to 2013, it is estimated that
the nation should be spending $87 billion per year to renew
facilities, leaving a $38 billion annual investment gap.191
Federal infrastructure conversations tend to focus on
transportation and energy, and often ignore K-12 public
schools, which represent the nation’s second-largest
infrastructure sector.192 According to the ASCE, school
districts’ ability to fund maintenance has been constricted,
contributing to the accelerating deterioration of heating,
cooling, and lighting systems.193 Decisions to defer
maintenance and pursue less expensive, temporary fixes
ultimately end up costing school districts more money in the
long term, and prevent long-term solutions to this
infrastructure problem.194
Fortunately, the current Congress has proposed a
solution to tackle the nation’s infrastructure challenges,
possibly serving as an alternative to including adequate
facilities in a federal literacy standard.195 Speaker of the
house, Nancy Pelosi, announced after the 2018 midterm
elections that infrastructure would be one of the House’s top
priorities.196
Shortly
after
this
announcement,
Representative Bobby Scott, chair of the House Education
and Labor Committee,197 introduced the “Rebuild America’s
Schools Act” to invest $100 billion for schools through two
191. Id.
192. Jimenez, supra note 185, at 1; see also Lauren Camera, Will Trump Help
Rebuild America’s Schools?, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 31, 2018, 11:46 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2018-01-31/infrastructurespending-for-schools-if-history-repeats-itself-no.
193. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, supra note 185, at 82.
194. Id.
195. See Sara Friedman, House Democrats Introduce $100B School
Infrastructure Bill, THE JOURNAL (Jan. 31, 2019), https://thejournal
.com/articles/2019/01/31/house-democrats-introduce-100b-school-infrastructurebill.aspx?m=1.
196. Jimenez, supra note 185, at 2.
197. EDUCATION AND LABOR COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN
https://edlabor.house.gov (last visited June 15, 2020).

BOBBY
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programs designed to meet the needs of school facilities that
pose health and safety risks.198 This legislation creates a $70
billion grant program and a $30 billion tax credit bond
program specifically targeted to schools across the country
with decades-old infrastructure issues.199 The bill has 152
cosponsors in the House, and is an important step towards
addressing national infrastructure challenges.200 According
to the House and Education Labor Committee, the
legislation would also leverage federal, state, and local
resources for an overall investment of $107 billion, and
would create 1.9 million jobs.201 A solution through federal
legislation will provide a steady source of federal funds to
help local school districts such as Detroit Public Schools. A
federal district court would be stepping into a complex,
additional issue if it required local school districts to
“intervene” in fixing all school buildings without the support
of federal funds. This form of requested relief is too
expansive, and litigants should not include “adequate
facilities” as part of a judicial remedy for literacy access.
Instead, litigants should focus on the aspects of literacy
that most closely relate to students’ abilities to grow as
readers. Litigants should argue that access to literacy
requires consistent, evidence-based literacy instruction at
the elementary and secondary level. This evidence-based
literacy instruction would include a system of regular
assessment to monitor individual student reading levels,
intervention for students who read below their grade level,
basic instructional materials such as up-to-date textbooks,
teacher access to curricular materials such as lesson plans
and pacing guides, and an appropriately trained teaching
staff. These are essential components to ensuring proper

198. Rebuild America’s Schools Act, H.R. 2475, 116th Cong. (2019); see also
Friedman, supra note 195; Jimenez, supra note 185, at 2.
199. Friedman, supra note 195.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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literacy instruction for students in all school districts, and
could serve as the basic benchmark which federal courts
would be required to enforce. Unlike the plaintiffs in Gary
B., who argued that the defendants violated various negative
rights,202 litigants should point exclusively to a positiverights argument. By asserting that the constitutional
standard is “access to literacy,” litigants would be making
the positive-rights argument that students are entitled to a
minimum level of instruction on learning to read.
While some may argue that “literacy” itself is a low
standard, framing a constitutional standard in this way
would have powerful results in struggling school districts
such as Detroit. Defining the standard as “access to literacy”
could improve the opportunities available to countless
students, as districts such as Detroit Public Schools are of
such poor quality that many children who attend these
schools are functionally illiterate.203 It would also serve as a
more specific, quantifiable standard, as opposed to vague
definitions such as “access to education” or a “right to
education.” Thus, federal court litigants should continue to
argue that the proper standard for a constitutionally
adequate education—a standard that has yet to be defined
by the Supreme Court—lies in access to literacy.

202. Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (“The
Complaint alleges that each Plaintiff was denied access to literacy and repeatedly
speaks of the denial of access to literacy. In a sense, the phrasing evokes the
notion of a barrier: Defendants have kept Plaintiffs from accessing literacy and
but for Defendants’ obstruction, Plaintiffs could and would have access. In other
words, the allegations state the violation of a negative right.”) (emphasis added).
203. See Bowman, supra note 46, at 64, 69–70.
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II. ACCESS TO LITERACY IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
This Part argues that the Due Process Clause204 and
Citizenship Clause205 of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee access to literacy as a fundamental right. Even
though this right is not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, it is an implied fundamental right which courts
must recognize. In determining whether a right is
fundamental, courts do not rely on a clear-cut, consistent
formula.206 There are various methods the Supreme Court
has used to identify implied fundamental rights.207 The
Court has recognized certain rights as fundamental because:
(1) they are important; (2) they are implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution; (3) they are deeply rooted in the nation’s
history and tradition; (4) they provide necessary access to
governmental processes; and (5) previous Supreme Court
precedents so identify them.208 This Part will also show how
access to literacy is not only an essential aspect of day-to-day
life, but is also implicitly required to carry out citizenship
rights.
A. The Due Process Clause is an avenue for access to
literacy
Even though access to literacy is not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution, federal court litigants
should argue that it is an implied fundamental right, and
substantive due process is a means by which courts may
recognize this right. Through the Due Process Clause, the

204. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
205. Id.
206. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Due
Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined
by reference to any code.”); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 501
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
207. Robert C. Farrell, An Excess of Methods: Identifying Implied Fundamental
Rights in the Supreme Court, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 216 (2007).
208. Id.
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Supreme Court has imposed an affirmative duty on states to
protect individual rights where the state has restrained an
individual’s liberty.209
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states that, “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”210 The
clause has both procedural and substantive components.211
Under the doctrine of procedural due process, the state may
not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
notice and a hearing.212 The doctrine of substantive due
process imposes substantive limits on the government
whenever an official action interferes with activity that is
within a protected interest defined as “life,” “liberty,” or
“property.” In the case of Gary B. v. Snyder, the plaintiffs
raised a substantive, rather than procedural, due process
argument.213 Furthermore, government actions that burden
the exercise of a fundamental right or liberty interest are
subject to strict scrutiny, and will be upheld only when they
are narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest.214
In order to understand how to make a strong substantive
due process argument, it is necessary to evaluate how federal
courts have recently responded to this argument. The Gary
B. plaintiffs’ due process claim turned on whether access to

209. Improving Educational Outcomes, supra note 31, at 1324.
210. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
211. Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 871 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (quoting
Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 588 (6th Cir. 2014).
212. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976) (“Procedural
due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. . . . This Court
consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual
is finally deprived of a property interest.”).
213. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 871.
214. Id. at 871 (quoting Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2000)).
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literacy is a fundamental right.215 In making this
determination, the District Court first defined a
“fundamental right” by turning to Obergefell v. Hodges.216 In
Obergefell, the Supreme Court explained:
The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an
enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.
That responsibility, however, has not been reduced to any formula.
Rather, it requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in
identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State
must accord them its respect. That process is guided by many of the
same considerations relevant to analysis of other constitutional
provisions that set forth broad principles rather than specific
requirements. History and tradition guide and discipline this
inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.217

This process of determining which interests are
fundamental is clearly a difficult one.218 In Gary B., the
District Court was reluctant to recognize access to literacy as
a fundamental right out of concern that liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause, however well
intentioned, could be transformed into a court’s policy
preferences.219 However, the District Court’s overly cautious
reasoning places little faith in the ability of judges and courts
to responsibly recognize new rights. When judges must
determine which rights are fundamental, they are not given
limitless discretion to “decide cases in light of their personal
and private notions.”220 Rather, “they must look to the
‘traditions and [collective] conscience of our people’ to
215. Id.
216. See id. at 871–72; Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
217. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (citation omitted).
218. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majority is, of course, correct when it suggests
that the process of determining which interests are fundamental is a difficult one.
But I do not think the problem is insurmountable.”).
219. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 872 (first citing Washington v. Glucksburg,
521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); and then citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 501 (1977)).
220. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
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determine whether a principle is ‘so rooted [there] . . . as to
be ranked as fundamental.’”221 According to Justice Goldberg
in his Griswold v. Connecticut concurring opinion, the
inquiry is whether a right involved is “of such a character
that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions.”222 Absent judicial
protection of certain rights, legislatures might impose unjust
laws, or fail to address certain evils.223 This is where judicial
response is crucial. Even though the recognition of
fundamental rights is rare, the Court has previously
recognized implied rights when necessary. For example, the
right to travel between states is inferred from the
Constitution, and the right of freedom of association is
implied from the First Amendment rights of speech, press,
assembly, and petition.224 Therefore, the infrequency of
courts recognizing fundamental rights should not serve as a
main opposing factor in the recognition of access to literacy.
Justice Marshall also explained his own take on the
process of recognizing fundamental rights. In his Rodriguez
dissent, Justice Marshall stated, “I certainly do not accept
the view that the process need necessarily degenerate into
an unprincipled, subjective ‘picking-and-choosing’ between
various interests . . . .”225 He also found that “the task in
every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on
221. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934).
222. Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
223. See BREST
(6th ed. 2015).

ET AL.,

PROCESSES

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1527

224. Id. at 1524.
225. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). But see BREST ET AL., supra note 223, at 1527 (“Both
Black and Stewart argue that however well intentioned judges may be, it will be
difficult if not impossible for judges to articulate a conception of constitutional
fidelity in these cases. Instead, they argue, judges will end up imposing their own
visions of the good on the public.”).
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interests not mentioned in the Constitution.”226
Nevertheless, even though Supreme Court precedent has
recognized implied fundamental rights, there must be
additional arguments to show that a particular right is
fundamental.227 Here, access to literacy is an implied
fundamental right because of literacy’s importance, its
repeated emphasis in previous Supreme Court precedent,
and its roots in American history and tradition.
1. Literacy is an implied fundamental right because of
its importance
One of the reasons access to literacy is an implied
fundamental right is because of its importance. Courts and
litigants must afford due weight to controlling Supreme
Court precedent, which expressly embraces importance in
justifying rights to education. Courts have identified implied
fundamental rights by simply asking: how important is the
claimed right?228 In this case, literacy is an indispensable
aspect of education and of life. Literacy is tied to everything
we do and is essential to a child’s development.229 It is an
“every-century skill” that educators across all content areas,
including math, history, science, and art must factor into
their classroom instruction.230 According to author Richard
Vaca, “Adolescents entering the adult world in the twentyfirst century will read and write more than at any other time
in human history. They will need advanced levels of literacy
to perform their jobs, run their households, act as citizens,

226. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 102.
227. BREST ET AL., supra note 223, at 1525.
228. Farrell, supra note 207, at 217.
229. Dr. Kirk Panneton, The Importance of Literacy in a Child’s Development,
ALBANY BUSINESS REVIEW (Jan. 21, 2015, 1:29 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/
albany/news/2015/01/21/the-importance-of-literacy-in-a-child-s.html.
230. Rebecca Alber, How Important is Teaching Literacy in All Content Areas?,
EDUTOPIA (Aug. 4, 2010), https://www.edutopia.org/blog/literacy-instructionacross-curriculum-importance (last updated Jan. 15, 2014).
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and conduct their personal lives.”231 Literacy is essential for
individuals to perform well in school, maintain a healthy
self-image, become sought-after employees, and support
themselves financially and personally in the future.232
Furthermore, Kofi Annan emphasized the importance of
literacy to other goals and values when he stated, “Literacy
is a bridge from misery to hope. It is a tool for daily life in
modern society. It is a bulwark against poverty, and a
building block of development, an essential complement to
investments in roads, dams, clinics, and factories.”233
However, the Gary B. District Court disagreed with the
plaintiffs’ argument and reasoned that the importance of a
good or service does not determine whether it must be
regarded as fundamental.234 The “importance” test failed to
convince the District Court. In fact, the District Court
analogized the plaintiffs’ argument to various federal cases
that failed to recognize certain rights based on their
“importance.”235 For example, the District Court cited
Lindsey v. Normet,236 a case in which the Supreme Court did
not consider decent, safe, and sanitary housing to be a
fundamental right.237 In addition, the District Court cited
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,238 a Supreme Court case that rejected the notion
that the Due Process Clause compelled a state to protect a

231. Id.
232. Panneton, supra note 229.
233. Shaver, supra note 170, at 30.
234. See Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (first
quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973); and
then citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)).
235. See Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 873–74.
236. Normet, 405 U.S. at 74.
237. See id. (“We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary
housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill.”).
238. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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child from abuse by his father.239 The District Court also
cited Ransom v. Marrazzo,240 a Third Circuit case that
concluded there is no fundamental right to receive water and
sewer service.241 Furthermore, the District Court relied on
Stiles v. Grainger County,242 a Sixth Circuit case that
rejected the notion of a due process right to be free from
aggressive and physical bullying in school.243 By relying on
this line of precedent in its analysis, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan failed to use literacy’s
importance as a means by which to recognize the
fundamental right of access to literacy.244
Judge Eric Murphy’s dissenting opinion in the Sixth
Circuit’s Gary B. decision also made similar analogies
between literacy and other claimed rights.245 This is a
common argument amongst attorneys and commentators
who do not seek to establish a right to literacy.246 The dissent
reasoned, “While minimum levels of food, housing, and
239. See id. at 197.
240. Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1988).
241. See id. at 413.
242. Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cty., 819 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2016).
243. See id. at 853.
244. The Supreme Court in the Rodriguez decision responded similarly. See
Constitutional Compromise, supra note 20, at 755–56 (“In . . . Rodriguez, the
plaintiffs theorized that education is a fundamental right because it is essential
to the exercise of other constitutional rights such as voting and free speech. The
Court responded that a right’s importance alone does not determine whether it is
fundamental. . . . The Court also expressed serious policy concerns with
recognizing education as a fundamental right. Doing so might create a slippery
slope for recognizing other new rights, alter the federalism balance between
states and the federal government, and require the Court to make educational
judgments beyond its expertise.” (footnotes omitted)). Nevertheless, there have
been many attempts via scholarly work and litigation to reverse or litigate
around the Rodriguez decision.
245. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 667 (6th Cir. 2020) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting), vacated en banc, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem).
246. See, e.g., Ogletree et al., supra note 141, at 73 (“Declaring education to be
an implicit fundamental right would raise difficult constitutional questions about
essentials such as food, shelter, and health care—none of which are mentioned in
the federal Constitution.”).
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medical care are critical for human flourishing and for the
exercise of constitutional rights, due process does not compel
states to spend funds on these necessities of life.”247 The
dissent claimed that DeShaney foreclosed any affirmative
right to these other benefits.248
In response, the Sixth Circuit majority reasoned
education is distinct from other claimed rights because of the
state’s level of control over public education.249 According to
the court, for the vast majority of students, public education
is their only source of learning.250 State-provided education
is expected by the public, as there is “no other area of day-today life that is so directly controlled by the state.”251 As a
result of this control, the court concluded the state has a
responsibility to provide access to literacy.252 The court also
reached this conclusion by distinguishing between the facts
of Gary B. and DeShaney.253 While DeShaney concerned the
state’s failure to prevent harm caused by a private actor,
Gary B. concerned the state’s failure to prevent harm caused
by Detroit Public Schools as a public actor.254 Because
DeShaney rested its holding on this public-private
distinction, the Sixth Circuit reasoned it may recognize
substantive due process claims when a public actor, such as
a public school, causes harm.255
The District Court and Sixth Circuit dissent’s analyses
conflated separate lines of fundamental rights cases and by
doing so unjustifiably disregarded controlling Supreme
Court precedents, which expressly embrace importance in
247. Whitmer, 957 F.3d at 667 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 667–68.
249. Id. at 658.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 658–59.
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justifying the judicial protection of rights to education.
Instead of analogizing literacy to various goods and services
such as sewer service, sanitary housing, protection from
child abuse, and freedom from bullying in school, the District
Court and Judge Murphy’s Sixth Circuit dissent could have
placed greater emphasis on the importance Supreme Court
precedent has placed on literacy and education. In a number
of decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized, in dicta, the
importance of a minimally adequate education.256 For
example, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme
Court recognized “the importance of education to our
democratic society.”257 Most significantly, the Court stated:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.258

It is clear that in Detroit, where five percent of the city’s
fourth-graders can read at or above a proficient level,
students are not being provided the education that lives up
to Brown’s standards. By failing to recognize access to
literacy, the arguable federal floor of educational quality,259
courts have abandoned the mandate of Brown and
disregarded the importance that this landmark precedent
placed on education.260
Similarly, in Plyler, the Court stressed education’s
“fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society”

256. Constitutional Compromise, supra note 20, at 757 n.105.
257. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
258. Id.
259. For a discussion regarding a federal floor of educational quality, see supra
Part I.
260. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 207 (2001) (“Sometimes I wonder if we
really did the children and the nation a favor by taking this case to the Supreme
Court. I know it was the right thing for my father and others to do then. But after
nearly forty years we find the Court’s ruling unfulfilled.”).
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and the “significant social costs borne by our Nation when
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and
skills upon which our social order rests.”261 Having thus
emphasized the importance of education, the Plyler Court
reasoned that, “[b]y denying these children a basic education,
we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our
civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that
they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress
of our Nation.”262 In fact, the Plyler Court noted that
education was not simply some government benefit
“indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation.”263 Significantly, Plyler specifically reasoned
that, “Illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to
read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a
basic education each and every day of his life.”264
Simply put, the Supreme Court has never articulated the
importance of these other benefits in the same consistent
way as it has articulated the importance of education.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never reasoned that
certain benefits such as sewer service, sanitary housing,
protection from child abuse, and freedom from bullying in
school are necessary for maintaining the fabric of our society.
The Gary B. plaintiffs cited both Brown and Plyler in support
of their “importance” argument, yet they failed to specifically
distinguish literacy from other benefits. By distinguishing
literacy from other benefits, litigants would be able to show
how recognizing literacy would not lead to a “slippery slope”
of recognizing “any” good or service that provides a benefit.
The Sixth Circuit may have distinguished between
education and other claimed rights, but the court focused its
reasoning on the state’s level of control over public education,
and the distinction between public and private actors. Courts
261. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
262. Id. at 223.
263. Id. at 221.
264. Id. at 222.

2020]

ACCESS TO LITERACY

1261

must go further and recognize that the Supreme Court has
placed a heightened level of importance on education that it
has never articulated concerning other claimed rights. The
District Court even recognized the importance of literacy in
its Gary B. decision, even though this decision ultimately
held access to literacy was not a fundamental right. The
District Court reasoned:
Plainly, literacy—and the opportunity to obtain it—is of
incalculable importance. As Plaintiffs point out, voting,
participating meaningfully in civic life, and accessing justice
require some measure of literacy. Applying for a job, securing a
place to live, and applying for government benefits routinely require
the completion of written forms. Simply finding one’s way through
many aspects of ordinary life stands as an obstacle to one who
cannot read.265

The Supreme Court has never reasoned that other
benefits such as sewer service or freedom from bullying in
school maintain the same level of societal importance as
literacy. Thus, by emphasizing the reasoning of Supreme
Court precedent, the repeated value this precedent has
placed on the importance of education and literacy, and the
vast distinction between literacy and other claimed rights,
litigants in other circuits may be able to successfully argue
that access to literacy is a fundamental right.
2. Literacy is an implied fundamental right because it
is a significant piece of American history and tradition
Another reason access to literacy is a fundamental right
is because it is deeply reflected in American history and
tradition. The Court has sometimes reasoned that the test
for determining fundamental rights is to ask whether it is
rooted in our nation’s history and traditions.266 In fact,
Justice Scalia primarily relied upon this test as a way to
discern fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause.267
265. Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
266. Farrell, supra note 207, at 225.
267. Id.
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Furthermore, according to Griswold, courts often turn to
history and tradition to protect implied fundamental
rights.268
For example, in Washington v. Glucksberg,269 the Court
used tradition to reject claims of a fundamental right to
assisted suicide. As Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned, “the
Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental
rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.”270 The Court then held
that there could be no substantive due process right to
assisted suicide because there was a “consistent and almost
universal tradition” that had long rejected the right to choose
the time and manner of one’s death.271 This tradition
continued to explicitly reject assisted suicide, even for
terminally ill, mentally competent adults.272
Another example of the Court’s reliance on history and
tradition in cases that involve substantive due process
questions is Lawrence v. Texas.273 However, the Court
applied the history and tradition approach in the opposite
way it did in Glucksberg.274 In Lawrence, the Court struck
down Texas’s criminal ban on same-sex sodomy.275 Texas
argued there was an established tradition of prosecuting acts
because of their homosexual character, but the Court
reasoned that while history and tradition are the starting
point, they are not always the ending point of the substantive

268. BREST ET AL., supra note 223, at 1533 (“Justice Cardozo argued in Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), that the Due Process Clause protects those
liberties ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.’”).
269. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
270. Id. at 720–21 (citation omitted).
271. Id. at 723.
272. Id.
273. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
274. Id. at 568–71; BREST ET AL., supra note 223, at 1534.
275. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.
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due process inquiry.276
American history and tradition clearly indicate that
access to literacy is a fundamental right. Scholars, most
notably Professor Derek Black, have used the history of
Reconstruction to argue for a fundamental right to
education. The immediate aftermath of the Civil War
presented numerous challenges, including high illiteracy
rates and, in particular, the process of ensuring that
freedmen and poor whites could fully participate in
democracy.277 In addition, Congress was divided on whether
it was appropriate to readmit Southern states with no
conditions other than the abolition of slavery, or to require
changes beyond abolition.278 Congress ultimately required
Southern states to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment and
rewrite their state constitutions to that of a republican form
of government.279 When these Southern states rewrote their
constitutions, Congress expected the states to guarantee
education.280 States that did not follow this federal
requirement would be refused readmission to the Union.
Congress remained steadfast in this requirement and, as a
result, by 1868, nine out of ten Southern states seeking
admission rewrote their constitutions to guarantee
education.281
The Gary B. District Court also briefly grounded its
reasoning in American history and tradition. The District
Court reasoned there is no right to access literacy because
there was a lack of an established public school system in the

276. Id. at 571–72, 577; BREST ET AL., supra note 223, at 1534.
277. Derek Black, The Constitutional Right to Education is Long Overdue, THE
CONVERSATION (Dec. 4, 2017, 11:08 PM), http://theconversation.com/theconstitutional-right-to-education-is-long-overdue-88445.
278. Constitutional Compromise, supra note 20, at 775.
279. Black, supra note 277.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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United States by 1830.282 Specifically, the court stated:
[T]here was no federal or state-run school system anywhere in the
United States as late as 1830. School districts at the time of the
Constitution’s ratification were formed when a group of farms came
together and decided to construct a public building for schooling,
where their children could gather and be taught reading, writing,
and moral codes of instruction.283

The court reasoned this history reflects a deep American
commitment to education, but does not support the idea that
ordered society demands that a state provide an education.284
The Sixth Circuit panel relied upon American history
and tradition much more heavily than the District Court.
One of the reasons the Sixth Circuit held that access to
literacy is a fundamental right is because a basic minimum
education has a longstanding presence in history and
tradition.285 The court reasoned state-provided education
was “ubiquitous” throughout the earliest days of the nation,
which today leads “citizens to expect a basic public education
as of right.”286 The court also noted the Northwest
Ordinance’s 1787 prescription that “schools and the means
of education shall forever be encouraged.”287 In addition, the
court pointed to our nation’s history of racial
discrimination.288 The court discussed how “slaveholders and
segregationists used the deprivation of education as a
weapon, preventing African Americans from obtaining the
political power needed to achieve liberty and equality.”289 For
282. Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 874 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (first
quoting Friedman & Solow, supra note 2, at 117; and then citing FREDERICK M.
BINDER, THE AGE OF THE COMMON SCHOOL: 1930-1865 20 (1974)).
283. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
284. Id.
285. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 648–52 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated en
banc, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem).
286. Id. at 649.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 650.
289. Id.
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example, Klansmen targeted schoolteachers and Black
parents who sent their children to school, and the postReconstruction era “heralded legislative and policy efforts
designed to limit the education of African Americans.”290
This reasoning ultimately led the Sixth Circuit panel to
conclude that the right to access to literacy is deeply rooted
in American history and tradition as to meet the historical
prong of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process test.291
However, the Gary B. District Court and Sixth Circuit
panel decisions fail to account for the Reconstruction policies
that show how American government was intent on
addressing the literacy crisis and ensuring an educated
citizenry. At the time of Reconstruction, Congress also
funded the Freedmen’s Bureau, which expanded educational
opportunities to African Americans and poor whites.292
These Reconstruction policies aimed to equip all citizens to
read, write, and participate in the political process.293
According to Lawrence Cremin, “the lion’s share of
Reconstruction policy was essentially educational policy.”294
Without literacy, educational policy can never take root. It is
essential to the flourishing of any educational growth.
Thus, history reflects Congress’s intent to vastly “expand
and formalize” educational opportunity.295 The federal
290. Id. at 651.
291. Id. at 652.
292. Constitutional Compromise, supra note 20, at 782; Derek W. Black, The
Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1059, 1098–99 (2019).
The Freedmen’s Bureau reflects the strong federal role in education during
Reconstruction. “From 1866-1870, under the leadership of General Oliver Otis
Howard, the Bureau spent over two-thirds of its funds and leveraged the
resources of private charities to educate approximately 100,000 students each
year. These efforts were substantial and had lasting significance, especially in
higher education.” However, the Bureau left an ambiguous legacy in the
development of federal responsibility for education. Goodwin Liu, Education,
Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 371–72 (2006).
293. Constitutional Compromise, supra note 20, at 782.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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government clearly demanded that states provide their
constituents with an education. As a result, the “access to
literacy” litigation that may continue to come before federal
courts offers an opportunity to continue this established
American tradition in favor of a well-educated citizenry. The
Sixth Circuit panel properly relied upon the ubiquity of
public education in the earliest days of the nation, and the
history of racial discrimination in America, but the decision
could have gone further by recognizing the parallels between
Reconstruction policy and educational policy. Litigants may
therefore ground their arguments in history and tradition to
recognize a fundamental right to access literacy.
B. Literacy is an implied, peripheral right of American
citizenship
Federal courts must directly address an implied
fundamental rights argument, because without the right to
access literacy, citizenship rights will not truly be
guaranteed. This is an additional approach to using the Due
Process Clause as an avenue to access to literacy. As Justice
Marshall
expressed
in
his
Rodriguez
dissent,
constitutionally guaranteed rights may be dependent on
interests not mentioned in the Constitution.296 He recognized
that interests such as procreation, the exercise of the state
franchise, and access to criminal appellate processes are not
fully guaranteed to citizens by our Constitution.297 Yet, these
interests are fundamental rights because they are
“interrelated” with guaranteed constitutional rights.298 He
reasoned, “Only if we closely protect the related interests
from state discrimination do we ultimately ensure the
integrity of the constitutional guarantee itself.”299 Similarly,

296. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 103.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut reasoned that,
“Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be
less secure.”300 Justice Marshall and the Supreme Court thus
emphasized the notion of implied fundamental rights.
Without these implied, peripheral rights, specifically
enumerated rights would not be ensured. It may therefore be
argued that access to literacy is an implied, peripheral right
of citizenship.
All American citizens enjoy rights of citizenship, and the
American system of government relies on an active and
engaged citizenry.301 As former Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis once stated, “The only title in our democracy
superior to that of President [is] the title of citizen.”302 Some
rights of American citizenship include the right to vote in
elections for public officials, the right to a prompt, fair trial
by jury, the right to apply for federal employment requiring
American citizenship, and the right to run for elected
office.303 All citizens also enjoy the right to own property, to
conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.304
Ultimately, “peripheral” literacy rights are necessary to
ensure guaranteed citizenship rights. Citizenship requires
basic literacy abilities to carry out duties such as voting,
serving on a jury, participating in community affairs, and
exercising the freedom of speech.305 Without literacy,
students will not be able to participate in American civic
institutions, such as the political process. Citizens will be
unable to read about election candidates and will therefore
300. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965).
301. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVS., THE CITIZEN’S ALMANAC 2 (2014) [hereinafter THE CITIZEN’S ALMANAC];
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (last visited July 13, 2020) [hereinafter
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES].
302. THE CITIZEN’S ALMANAC, supra note 301, at 2.
303. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 301.
304. Liu, supra note 292, at 342.
305. Id. at 345.
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be prevented from voting for their preferred candidates.306
Even in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court stated that
education, “is the very foundation of good citizenship.”307 In
Plyler, the Court explained that “[b]y denying these children
a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the
structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic
possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way
to the progress of our Nation.”308 Literacy is therefore
essential to carry out rights of citizenship.
The District Court in Gary B. explicitly acknowledged
the importance of literacy in carrying out activities of
citizenship.309 However, the District Court failed to recognize
the necessity of literacy in carrying out these activities
inherent in basic citizenship. Literacy is not only important,
but also absolutely necessary to carry out activities involved
in meaningful civic life. An illiterate individual is completely
unable to vote, serve on a jury, or independently apply for
government benefits. Even the Sixth Circuit panel embraced
the dependency of a citizen’s interaction with the
government on literacy.310 The court held that access to
306. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51–52
(1959) (citing Franklin v. Harper, 55 S.E.2d 221, 224 (Ga. 1949)) (“The ability to
read and write . . . has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent
use of the ballot. . . . Yet in our society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and
other printed matter canvass and debate campaign issues, a State might conclude
that only those who are literate should exercise the franchise.”).
307. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
308. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[S]ome degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens
to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are
to preserve freedom and independence.”).
309. Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (“Plainly,
literacy—and the opportunity to obtain it—is of incalculable importance. As
Plaintiffs point out, voting, participating meaningfully in civic life, and accessing
justice require some measure of literacy. Applying for a job, securing a place to
live, and applying for government benefits routinely require the completion of
written forms. Simply finding one’s way through many aspects of ordinary life
stands as an obstacle to one who cannot read.”).
310. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 649 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated en banc,
958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem).
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literacy is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, because
it is necessary for even the most limited participation in our
country’s democracy.311 The court noted, “[t]he degree of
education [the plaintiffs] seek through this lawsuit—namely,
access to basic literacy—is necessary for essentially any
political participation.”312 The court cited numerous
examples of basic public responsibilities that require
literacy, including completing a voter registration form,
complying with a summons sent through the mail, and a
juror’s understanding of documents when used as evidence
against a defendant.313
Yet, the Gary B. plaintiffs failed to specifically argue that
literacy access is an “implied, peripheral” right that leads to
other rights. The plaintiffs also failed to cite federal
precedent that recognizes implied fundamental rights.
Federal courts must directly address this implied
fundamental rights argument, or else citizenship rights will
not truly be guaranteed. Litigants should also emphasize
literacy’s absolute necessity in carrying out basic aspects of
American citizenship, and federal courts should recognize
that illiteracy serves as a permanent roadblock to achieving
meaningful citizenship.

311. Id.
312. Id. at 652.
313. Id. at 652–53.
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III. JUDICIAL IMPLICATIONS: IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS
AND REPERCUSSIONS OF RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT TO ACCESS
TO LITERACY
Recognizing a constitutional right to access to literacy
carries many questions, particularly policy concerns of
enforcing this “positive right.”314 If federal courts followed
the panel decision’s reasoning in Gary B., the alleged
constitutional right would be a newly articulated one: access
to literacy. Unlike the plaintiffs in Gary B. who framed their
argument as a “negative right” (“denial” of access to literacy),
litigants who bring similar claims in federal court should
make a positive-right argument in their complaints.
Litigants would argue that students are entitled to a
minimum level of instruction on learning to read.315
However, it may be argued that the policy concerns that
would come with recognizing this right to literacy access
would prove too burdensome.316 For example, critics of
recognizing positive rights have argued that judges are ill
equipped to create and define the scope of positive rights.317
There are those who argue that the federal judiciary lacks
the capacity and expertise to solve problems like the
opportunity gap from the bench.318 Attorneys, commentators,
and other contrarians who oppose federal means of achieving
literate masses argue that advocates for a federal right to
some level of education presume that federal judges would
succeed where local policymakers have failed.319 Another
criticism is that if we recognize affirmative governmental

314. See Jenna MacNaughton, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law: No Need
to Graft, Best Not to Prune, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 750, 778–79 (2001); Ogletree et
al., supra note 141, at 75, 77; Bowman, supra note 46, at 65–68.
315. This would not require a reversal of Rodriguez because the right to “access
to literacy” is a different standard than the right to “education.”
316. See Ogletree et al., supra note 141, at 73, 75, 77.
317. MacNaughton, supra note 314, at 776–77.
318. Ogletree et al., supra note 141, at 77.
319. Id.
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duties in some cases, we will be forced to recognize them in
other cases, “creating havoc for lawmakers and
administrators.”320 Once federal courts recognize a right to
literacy, where would this end? Some argue that this
recognition of a positive right will lead to a “slippery slope”
of being forced to recognize other rights.321
Notably, these criticisms of constitutional positive rights
are all hypothetical.322 Because the federal judiciary rarely
recognizes positive rights claims, none of these predicted
problems have even occurred.323 In fact, state courts and
foreign countries have proven successful in enforcing positive
rights.324
If federal courts recognized a constitutional right to
literacy, there would have to be judicial dialogue with state
legislatures.325 Instead of promulgating a “one-size-fits-all”
remedy, federal courts should allow states to continue to
serve as laboratories of experimentation and innovation that
decide how best to provide the right to access literacy.326 For
example, perhaps states could mandate that “evidence-based
literacy instruction” requires maximum student class sizes
of twenty students, or mental health counselors at every
school. In addition, it would be necessary for courts to defer
to the professional judgment of education experts and
teachers. In fact, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have repeatedly mentioned the need to defer to the judgment
of professionals.327

320. MacNaughton, supra note 314, at 777.
321. See supra Part II Section A, which also acknowledges this “slippery slope”
argument. Part II emphasizes the distinction between literacy and other benefits
such as housing and sewer services.
322. MacNaughton, supra note 314, at 778–79.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 779.
325. Id. See Ogletree et al., supra note 141, at 76.
326. Ogletree et al., supra note 141, at 76.
327. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (“[C]ourts must show
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Ultimately, federal courts would need to establish clear
guidelines and federal limits about what the right to access
literacy requires, while also affording flexibility in how
states implement it.328 This approach would strike the ideal
balance between providing federal accountability and
retaining state and local control over education. As a result,
this balance would also serve as a check on state legislatures
to prevent legislative inaction.329 Constant line drawing and
neglect on the part of the federal judiciary will only lead to a
continued national illiteracy crisis. Recognizing this
essential right and establishing federal accountability would
lead to a result our education system desperately needs:
justice.

deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional.”); id. at 323
(“[T]he decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid.”); id. at 324
(“[D]ecisions made by the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption
of correctness.”).
328. Ogletree et al., supra note 141, at 76 (reasoning that while state and local
control of education has been praised for experimentation and innovation, this
level of control has also failed to eliminate the substandard schools that many
children attend).
329. See MacNaughton, supra note 314, at 780–81.
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CONCLUSION
As Frederick Douglass said, “Once you learn to read, you
will be forever free.” Yet, the freedom of literacy is currently
being denied to thirty-two million Americans. All the while,
state legislatures have proven inept at finding meaningful
solutions, and the federal judiciary continues to remain on
the sidelines. Despite the en banc Sixth Circuit’s decision to
vacate the panel decision, federal court litigants in other
circuits must continue to bring claims advocating for a right
to access to literacy.330 After all, the Supreme Court has
never answered the question whether there is a federal right
for students to receive a minimally adequate education.
Thus, a school’s failure to provide an education of a certain
quality violates the Constitution. In the meantime, the Sixth
Circuit’s original panel decision serves as powerful guidance
for litigants in other circuits who may wish to bring similar
fundamental rights claims.
Courts must not be overly cautious out of fear of turning
into a super-legislature. Once courts recognize a right to
access literacy, it will be necessary to defer to the judgment
of education experts and state legislatures, but to also
maintain the check of federal accountability. A uniform level
of accountability across the United States would allow the
330. In fact, litigants have recently brought a class action educational quality
case before a federal court in Rhode Island, which falls within the First Circuit.
The plaintiffs in the Cook v. Raimondo case went beyond literacy, and argued
that the state is not providing students an adequate education for capable civic
participation, as students are not receiving proper civics instruction. The
complaint argued the state is not providing adequate civics instruction because
of a lack of a civics course requirement, a vacant social studies coordinator
position at the state level, and no professional development for teachers related
to civics. Oral argument before the United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island took place on December 5, 2019, and a decision is still pending.
Teachers College of Columbia University, Cook v. Raimondo: The Case to
Establish a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution, THE CENTER FOR
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY, http://www.cookvraimondo.info/litigation-papers/. If the
First Circuit and the en banc Sixth Circuit ultimately arrive at different results,
this circuit split would provide a compelling reason for the Supreme Court to
address these constitutional issues. The result could forever change public
education in America.
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nation to take a step towards ending the literacy crisis, and
allow all citizens to receive a right to which they are entitled.
Perhaps the fourth-grade students of Detroit will finally
receive the excellent education they so eagerly seek.

